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Abstract This paper asks why peripheral European countries have been particularly
vulnerable to housing and mortgage booms in recent decades; how these booms have
shaped their exposure to the global financial crisis (GFC), and how the GFC has
affected peripheral housing finance. To answer these questions, it explores the interac-
tion between European processes of financial integration and domestic housing
(finance) policies in four peripheral countries. It argues that the EU framework for free
movement of capital and financial service provision as well as the availability of cheap
credit has induced a trajectory of housing financialization, which has taken two forms:
funding from wholesale markets and direct penetration of foreign financial institutions.
These two forms attest to a core-periphery relationship in housing financialization,
whose hierarchical character came to the fore in the crisis. Peripheral European
countries experienced sudden stops and reversals of capital flows, which badly affected
their banking systems. Unable to solve the looming banking crises on their own, they
had to turn to creditors to gain access to much needed capital. A combination of
international conditionality and domestic policy responses, and the original level of
mortgage debt result in different trajectories in housing finance after the crisis.
Keywords Housing . Financialization . Financial crisis . European periphery
Introduction
Why have the biggest European mortgage and housing booms and busts prior to the
global financial crisis (GFC) occurred in the continent’s periphery, rather than its core?
How have mortgage and housing booms affected these countries’ vulnerability to the
GFC, and how has the GFC affected peripheral housing finance? This paper seeks to
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understand the development of housing finance in peripheral European states. A small
but growing body of scholarly literature has established the centrality of housing
finance in contemporary capitalism. Housing has become a most significant absorber
of global liquidity, and innovations in housing finance have been identified as the root
cause of the GFC (e.g., Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Schwartz 2009; Ansell 2014;
Aalbers 2016). At the same time, national housing systems differ in how far they have
been integrated globally, the liquidity of their mortgage markets, and their reliance on
housing as a social protection mechanism (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Schelkle
2012). While originally the literature associated volatile housing markets and soaring
mortgage debt with the Anglo-American liberal market economies, recent work has
shown that these phenomena cross-cut established varieties of capitalism (ibid.). The
research has so far, however, mostly focused on advanced capitalist countries.
This paper seeks to probe further into the differences of residential capitalisms in
Europe, and their pre- and post-crisis trajectories. Specifically, it seeks to establish
communalities and differences among peripheral housing finance regimes in Europe.
The paper argues that high homeownership rates and unsophisticated mortgage markets
have characterized all of Europe’s East, South, and peripheral Northwest. Since the 1990s,
the evolving EU framework for free movement of capital and provision of financial
services as well as the availability of ample and cheap credit has induced a trajectory of
financialization in these countries. Financialization has taken two major but not mutually
exclusive forms: domestic banks’ reliance on (increasingly short-term) funding from
wholesale interbank markets and direct penetration of foreign financial institutions setting
off a—mostly foreign currency—mortgage lending boom. These two forms of
financialization attest to a core-periphery relationship, whose hierarchical character came
to the fore during the crisis. Most peripheral European countries experienced sudden stops
and reversals of capital flows, which adversely affected their banking systems. Not having
a domestic lender of last resort able to solve the looming banking crises, they had to turn to
international creditors to gain access to much needed capital. A combination of interna-
tional conditionality and domestic policy responses, and the original level of mortgage
debt have resulted in different trajectories in housing finance after the crisis.
While the paper focuses on similarities in housing finance trajectories, it also
accounts for the differences in timing of financialization, origins of homeownership
regimes, and policy responses. It does so by tracing the emergence of peripheral
housing finance regimes, and their pre- and post-crisis trajectories with four in-depth
case studies—Hungary, Latvia, Iceland, and Ireland. This mix of East and West
European countries with different housing finance legacies and institutions, and differ-
ent degrees of integration in the EU, reflects the diversity of Europe’s periphery.1 Yet,
despite their differences, all four countries have experienced major housing and
mortgage booms, and all of them are still reeling from the impact of the GFC on
housing and housing finance.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews existing literature,
establishes the puzzle, and develops the analytical framework. The third section traces
the origins of housing and mortgage booms in the four peripheral European countries,
and section four analyzes crisis exposure and responses. The last section concludes.
1 This paper does not cover Southern European cases in its analysis. Yet, most of the arguments made here can
also be extended to Spain and to a lesser degree to Portugal and Greece.
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Mortgage Finance and Housing in (European) Capitalism
One of the biggest puzzles of the EU’s crisis management and new economic gover-
nance is that it focuses almost exclusively on reining in public debt and increasing
competitiveness, while much of the crisis build-up was linked to private debt, and
specifically mortgage debt (IMF 2012; Jordà et al. 2014). Thus, many countries that
were hard hit by the crisis had very high outstanding mortgage debt. In Europe, it was
Iceland that had the highest mortgage debt relative to GDP. Iceland’s public debt in
2007 was 28% and residential mortgage debt was 119%. The close second and third
groups were the Netherlands and Denmark with almost 100 and 93%, whereas their
public debt stood at 42 and 27%, respectively. Among the peripheral European
countries, the level of residential mortgage debt surpassed that of the public debt in
Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and the Baltic States.2 Even in those countries where this was
not the case, the level of mortgage debt has increased significantly over the 2000s.3
Indeed, even more stunning than the level of mortgage debt has been its increase over
the last (two) decades. Figure 1 depicts the increase of mortgage debt and house price
increases prior to the GFC. It shows that mortgage and house-price booms have been
the strongest in East Central European countries, followed by Europe’s Western
periphery. Compared to the periphery, core countries’ house price and mortgage
lending increases seem rather moderate.
Of course, the three country groups are not homogenous. Among the core countries,
the UK had the highest house price and mortgage lending boom, and not all peripheral
countries have experienced major lending booms. Figure 2 further details mortgage
lending in the sample of peripheral countries. Here, three groups of countries can be
identified: the first group had already experienced a boom in mortgage debt during the
1990s—as witnessed by relatively high mortgage debt in 2002—and still registered
high growth rates during the first decade of the 2000s. Incidentally, these are all western
peripheral countries. The second group of countries started with almost no mortgage
debt in 2002 and registered very high growth rates until 2008. These are mostly East
Central European countries. Finally, the third group, made up of both western and
eastern peripheral countries did not experience much increase in their mortgage debt.
All in all, it is fair to say that a large majority of peripheral European countries
experienced very high mortgage lending growth rates during the early 2000s.
Despite the centrality of housing and housing finance in the GFC, the specific
challenges of peripheral housing regimes have not yet been well understood. A small
but growing literature that investigates the centrality of housing and mortgage debt for
contemporary capitalism provides an important starting point to the inquiry. Thus, in
their pioneering work, Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) and Schwartz (2009) distin-
guish between four varieties of residential capitalism (VoRC). The first, “liberal
market” type is characterized by high levels of house ownership, mortgage debt, and
liberal mortgage markets; and contrasts with the “statist-developmentalist” capitalism
2 The use of the term of European core and periphery has become more common in the wake of the Euro
crisis, acknowledging the fact that some European countries had been subject to much more destabilizing
capital inflows than others. In line with this, I use the term core countries for Europe’s North Western advanced
capitalist countries, and peripheral countries for the East Central and Southern European countries, as well as
Ireland and Iceland.
3 The data for mortgage debt are from EMF (2011); the data for public debt are from Eurostat.
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with low levels of owner occupation, mortgage debt, and highly controlled mortgage
markets. The “corporatist-market” capitalism has low levels of homeownership but
high levels of mortgage debt despite relatively controlled mortgage markets, whereas
“familial residential” capitalism has very high homeownership levels but low mortgage
debt. Interestingly, except for the Czech Republic, all European peripheral countries
considered by Schwartz and Seabrooke cluster in the familial type of residential
capitalism. Table 1 summarizes their typology.
While Schwartz and Seabrooke’s typology is crucial for understanding the starting
point of peripheral (or familial) housing finance regimes, it does not provide an answer
to the question as to why it was these regimes that have experienced massive credit
growth over the last two decades. To seek an answer, I turn to the work of Manuel
Aalbers and his co-authors on the financialization of housing, which complements
Schwartz and Seabrooke’s work (Aalbers 2008; Aalbers and Christophers 2014;
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Fig. 1 House price and mortgage lending (2002–2006). ECE countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia; Western European peripheral (WEP) countries are Greece, Italy,
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain; and core countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Norway,
Sweden, and the UK. Data for house prices are from Égert and Mihaljek 2007 and EMF 2014, data for















Fig. 2 Residential debt/GDP. Source: EMF 2013
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financialization, Aalbers argues that in the last one to two decades, a “global wall of
money”—a global pool of liquid capital that looks for investment opportunities—has
been built up. The global wall of money results from the rise of accumulated corporate
profits which are not being reinvested in the real economy or shared with workers, the
recycling of trade surpluses of emerging and export-oriented economies, and the
privatization of pension schemes and build-up of funded pensions. Housing and
mortgage debt, which are considered high quality collateral, have absorbed an increas-
ing amount of liquidity (Schwartz 2009; Fernandez and Aalbers 2016).
While privatization, deregulation, and the wall of money have induced a common
trend towards more financialized housing finance, these processes are filtered by
national institutions and policies. Fernandez and Aalbers (2016) sketch four different
trajectories. Not surprisingly, there is a strong affinity between these trajectories and the
VoRC as identified by Schwartz and Seabrooke. Thus, somewhat simplified, Fernandez
and Aalbers find that the liberal market and corporatist-market varieties have embraced
financialization, while in the statist-developmentalist and familial varieties, the trans-
formation of the housing and housing finance regimes has not yet reached the critical
point of financialization. Aalbers and Fernandez are not concerned with building
typologies, however, but rather with identifying a set of trajectories of housing centered
financialization.
My paper will delve further in examining trajectories of housing-centered
financialization by focusing on the similarities and differences among the trajectories
of peripheral—or familial—varieties of residential capitalism.4 In order to get to the
specificities of the mortgage lending booms across Europe’s periphery, and to assess
the post-crisis fate of financialization, this paper will build on VoRC’s insight that
familial housing (finance) regimes are set apart, and combine this with digging deeper
into the mechanisms of “subordinated financialization” (Lapavitsas 2013), where
peripheral countries are joining an increasingly financialized world economy while
lacking the state power and capacities for shaping the processes of financialization. To
this aim, I study four cases that have experienced major mortgage and housing booms
during the 2000s. My case selection includes two peripheral countries that, according to
Fernandez and Aalbers (2016), have crossed the threshold of housing
financialization—Ireland and Iceland—and two that have not—Latvia and Hungary.
These countries are also representative of the diversity of Europe’s peripheries. Located
Table 1 Varieties of Residential Capitalism
Owner occupation rate
Low High
Mortgage as % of GDP High Corporatist-market Liberal market
Low Statist-developmentalist Familial
Source: adapted from Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008: 244
4 I use peripheral and familial housing regimes interchangeably. As will become clear in the “Peripheral
Homeownership Regimes Meet Transnational Financial Markets” section, the reliance on family resources for
housing finance is related to these countries’ peripheral late industrialization.
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in Europe’s East and West, they represent different varieties of capitalism, and are
integrated in different ways in the European economy.
I seek to make four contributions to the existing literature. First, I include the
trajectories of East Central European housing finance in a debate that so far has mostly
focused on the West. Second, I further explore specificities of peripheral
financialization. Third, I analyze recent changes by studying the interaction of the
transnational liberalization of finance and domestic housing and housing finance
policies. This way, I open the “black box” of housing finance institutions and policies,
and show how they have developed over time. Fourth, I go beyond the build-up of the
mortgage boom to ask how the GFC has affected housing finance in Europe’s
periphery.
Peripheral Homeownership Regimes Meet Transnational Financial
Markets
As Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) note, there are some features that set the European
familial variety of residential capitalism apart from the advanced capitalist world. To
put it in a pointed fashion: most European peripheral countries started their journeys in
the world of transnational finance as debt-free or financially repressed high
homeownership societies. That is, while the owner occupation rate in Europe’s periph-
ery is significantly higher than in the core, mortgage debt has traditionally been much
lower, and/or mortgage lending has not been market-based. Thus, homeownership rates
in the periphery in 2000 ranged from more than 75% in Portugal and Ireland to around
90% in Spain, Iceland, Hungary and Romania. Concomitantly, these countries have
among the smallest rented sectors in Europe, and virtually no social renting (Allen et al.
2004; Sveinsson 2011; Hegedüs 2013; Norris 2016).
In the western and southern European periphery, high homeownership rates predate
the neoliberal turn towards private homeownership, and are closely related to the role of
late and limited industrialization and weak state capacity that are characteristic of the
periphery. In core Europe, the promotion of a social rental sector aimed at accommo-
dating the urban industrial labor force and is associated with large public or co-
operative ownership (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1988). In contrast, late and limited indus-
trialization in the periphery decreased the pressure for accommodating masses of new
city dwellers. At the same time, the peripheral states often lacked the capacity to
finance and manage a big rented sector (Allen et al. 2004: 166). Promoting
homeownership rather than social rentals was also a device to achieve social stability
(Allen et al. 2004; Dellepiane et al. 2013; Norris 2016). Europe’s western periphery
came to high homeownership via limited or highly decommodified mortgage debt.
Norris (2016) coined the term “socialized homeownership regime” for Ireland to denote
the generosity of state subsidies for private homeownership. Similar socialized
homeownership regimes also were in place in Southern Europe and Iceland (Allen
et al. 2004; Sveinsson 2011).
The Eastern European road to high owner occupation without mortgage debt was
different. While Eastern Europe was industrializing late too, it achieved an industrial
break-through behind the protective walls of state socialism. The communist ideology
and its bureaucratic form of governance, rapid industrialization and urbanization, and
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heavy war destruction all implied that the state took a leading role in providing large
scale housing after the World War II. The high homeownership rates in Eastern Europe
are therefore a direct result of transition policies after 1989. Indeed, transferring the
predominantly public housing stock into private hands was among the first steps
undertaken by post-communist governments, often in close collaboration with interna-
tional financial organizations such as the World Bank (Hegedüs 2013; Stephens et al.
2015). In this sense, it can be argued that their past as late industrializers caught up with
post-communist Eastern Europe: after 1989, private homeownership was considered
the norm, and large scale public housing stock a socialist aberration.
In Eastern Europe, even more than in peripheral Western Europe, high
homeownership rates were achieved despite the absence of liberal mortgage markets.
With transnational deregulation of the financial sector and the build-up of the wall of
money, things started to change. In Europe, it was the EU’s initiatives towards financial
market integration that channeled an increasing share of the global wall of money
through banks to Europe’s periphery and specifically its mortgage markets. Most
important in this respect was the Single Banking License, which entered into force in
1993, and enabled European banks to establish branches and provide cross-border
financial services in the EU and European Economic Area (EEA) (Decressin et al.
2007). At the same time, the EU Directives on Own Funds and Solvency Ratio, which
took effect in 1993, “introduced a preferential weighting for residential loans and
significantly increased the lenders’ ability to finance mortgage credit” (Whitehead
et al. 2014: 10). The introduction of the euro eliminated the currency risk and pushed
for further regulatory convergence among members of the eurozone. In addition,
interest rates set by the European Central Bank (ECB) made borrowing for peripheral
eurozone members disproportionally cheap, often resulting in negative real interest
rates (Honohan 2010: 11; Hay et al. 2008). All of this fueled cross-border lending,
allowing the banks of peripheral states to escape their narrow deposit base, and made
financing of mortgage credit much easier.
This is the background against which most of the West European peripheral
countries started to experience major mortgage lending booms from the 1990s onwards,
and Eastern Europe joined during the 2000s. The remainder of this section will look
more in detail at how mortgage and housing booms unfolded in Ireland, Iceland,
Hungary, and Latvia.
Mortgage Booms in Ireland and Iceland
Both Iceland and Ireland are infamously known for the stellar rise of their banking
sectors during the 2000s. In 2008, the banking systems’ total assets amounted to a
staggering 800% of GDP in Iceland and close to 700% in Ireland (Eckholdt
Christensen 2011: 116). In Ireland, the rapid growth of the banking sector was
intrinsically linked with a property and mortgage boom. In Iceland, banks have been
most famous for their international shopping spree. But also here, housing finance has
played a major role.
In both countries, the dismantling of the socialized homeownership regime (Norris
2016), combined with the deregulation and transnational integration of the banking
sector, led to unsustainable mortgage lending booms. In Ireland, a major crisis in the
1980s made the government turn away from publicly subsidizing homeownership.
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Instead, it began to deregulate mortgage finance. As a consequence, private banks
moved into the mortgage market, replacing the earlier system dominated by mutual
building societies and local governments (Kelly and Everett 2004; Norris and Coates
2010; Dellepiane et al. 2013). From 2003 onward, Irish banks started to rely heavily on
interbank lending not only from the euro area, but also the USA and UK (Honohan
2010; Lane 2015). Figure 3 shows the development of foreign claims of BIS-reporting
banks for all four countries since 1994. Before the GFC, there had been a rapid increase
of foreign claims everywhere, but the levels differ. In Ireland and Iceland, the claims
exceeded 300% of GDP and in Hungary and Latvia they were around 100%.5 Figure 3
also shows the sudden stop of foreign claims once the crisis hit, a development I will
return to later in the paper.
The established Irish banks also faced fierce competition by new foreign entrants
that started to expand aggressively—most infamously Anglo-Irish Bank. Competition
as well as a pronounced lack of regulation fostered reckless lending practices
(Dellepiane et al. 2013; Lane 2015). Policy makers did little to rein in risky lending
practices. It was only in 2003 that the Irish Financial Service Regulatory Agency was
established, and its independence from the Central Bank as well as the shortage of
skilled staff made it an utterly useless agency (Barnes and Wren 2012). The govern-
ment, in turn, fueled the housing boom by tax incentives. In this context, it is worth
mentioning that the Irish property and housing boom was greatly enhanced by a cozy
relationship between the main banks, politicians of the ruling Fianna Fáil party, and
developers, a relationship that dates back to the earlier phase of the social
homeownership regime (McDonald and Sheridan 2008; Dellepiane et al. 2013).
In comparison to Ireland, Iceland was a latecomer both in terms of banking and
mortgage deregulation. The seeds of Iceland’s ultra-liberal finance regime were also
sown in the 1980s, when a radical neoliberal faction emerged within the ruling
Independence Party. The end of the Cold War swept a prominent member of that
faction, David Oddson, to power. He was a Prime Minister from 1991 to 2004, and
subsequently became the Governor of the Central Bank. It was under his leadership that
the Icelandic financial sector was unleashed. The first important step was Iceland’s
accession to the EEA, which lifted restrictions on cross-border capital flows. Bank
privatization followed suit (Wade and Sigursgeirsdottir 2010: 12). Privatization and
deregulation enabled investment banks to enter the commercial banking markets, gain
access to consumer deposits, and resulted in a heavily concentrated banking sector
(ibid; Schwartz 2011).
The newly privatized banks soon began to expand into the mortgage market, hitherto
dominated by the government-backed Housing Financing Fund (HFF) (Schwartz 2011:
296). Banks started to offer increasingly attractive loans, and competition over mort-
gage provision started in earnest when the government relaxed the rules for mortgage
lending in 2004. From then on, Icelandic homeowners faced increasingly favorable
borrowing conditions. The newly privatized banks out-competed each other and the
HFF by offering housing loans with 90% of the purchase price or more, longer
maturities, and lower interest rates. The option of refinancing loans gave homeowners
5 Not all of Ireland’s cross-border lending was channeled into the housing market. Ireland’s high level of
foreign claims is closely linked to its position as an offshore financial center, which it has developed since
1987 (Tax Justice Network, 11/11/2015).
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the possibility to withdraw some of the home equity, and to lower their repayment costs
by taking new loans with more favorable conditions. Banks also aggressively pushed
homeowners to convert existing loans or take out new ones in foreign currencies,
mostly Swiss francs and Japanese yen, in order to take advantage of the lower interest
rates. As in Ireland, the rapidly increasing availability of cheap credits fueled a house
price boom (Benediktsdottir et al. 2011; Schwartz 2011; Sveinsson 2011; Viken 2011;
Hart-Landsberg 2013).
As well known, not only did Icelandic banks lend recklessly at home, but they
pursued even more reckless practices abroad. Arguably, the Icelandic elites bought
even more into the idea of light touch regulation than their Irish counterparts. Iceland’s
financial supervision was fragmented between three government departments, the
Central Bank, and the Financial Supervisory Authority, which had no functioning
cooperation. Even if they had wanted to, it is highly doubtful whether they had the
professional skill to exercise supervisory authority (Viken 2011).
Mortgage Booms in Hungary and Latvia6
For Hungary and Latvia, the most important trigger for mortgage lending has been their
deep transnational financial integration that went hand in hand with EU accession. The
combination of convergence on the institutional and regulative standards of the Euro-
pean financial area, the privatization of the banking sector, and the liberalization of


























































Fig. 3 Consolidated foreign claims of BIS reporting banks (% of GDP). Source: Worldbank and BIS Global
Financial Development Database, http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/global-financial-
development-database
6 Some of this subsection draws on Bohle 2014.
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countries to catch up fast in financial matters (e.g., Enoch and Ötker-Robe 2007; Pistor
2009; Mitra et al. 2010). Most notable is the high share of foreign ownership of their
banking sector, a development fostered by the EU, which saw in foreign banks a
guarantee for a sound banking system. From the early 2000s onwards, Austrian, Italian,
and Swedish banks moved into the region. In the mid-2000s, the asset share of foreign
banks was more than 82% in Hungary and above 60% in Latvia.7
Foreign banks were instrumental in developing the hitherto almost nonexistent
mortgage markets. They brought expertise in mortgage lending from their home
countries and could easily tap into foreign sources of credit expansion, usually through
borrowing from their parent banks. This is reflected in the increase of foreign claims
(Fig. 3). In both countries, foreign banks issued loans denominated in foreign curren-
cies, mostly Swiss francs in the Hungarian case and euros in Latvia. Taking advantage
of the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy in 2004–2007, banks engaged in large
scale carry trade of cheap international credit (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011: 29). For
consumers, foreign currency loans were attractive because of the favorable interest
rates.
Governments mostly acted in collusion with banks to create more liquid (and
inherently more risky) mortgage markets. In Hungary, the first national-conservative
government under Premier Viktor Orbán (1998–2002) adopted a program for gener-
ously subsidized housing loans and grants for young families to build or buy houses. In
addition, people who took a housing loan also received income tax exemption
(Rózsavölgyi and Kovács 2005). The continuous expansion of the program, however,
turned out to be financially unviable, and was phased out from 2003 (Hegedüs 2011:
119). From this moment on, foreign currency lending really took off. As demand for
housing remained very high, low interest rate Swiss franc lending provided a substitute
for publicly subsidized mortgage lending (Committee on Constitution, Justice, and
Standing Order of the Hungarian Parliament 2012). A very liberal financial environ-
ment and strong competition among banks fueled increasingly risky lending practices
(Banai et al. 2011; Józon 2015). Despite the fact that the Hungarian National Bank, the
Financial Supervisory Authority, and the IMF issued warnings about the foreign
currency exposure, Hungarian politicians remained passive on the issue (Bohle 2014).
In Latvia, before the large scale entry of foreign banks, mortgage lending was
scarce and expensive, with interest rates between 12 and 14%. In 2000, the
Berzins government adopted the first stage of a housing lending development
program, which aimed at encouraging the purchase or renovation of dwellings via
subsidized mortgages (Osa 2005: 200). Similar to Hungary, commercial banks’
foreign currency lending soon overtook publicly subsidized lending (Henilane
2016: 2). Foreign currency lending seemed a somewhat more natural choice in
Latvia than in Hungary. In the early 1990s, Latvia, as a newly independent state,
settled on a fixed exchange rate to signal credibility of its new currency to
financial markets. It initially pegged the currency to the Special Drawing Rights,
and in 2000 to the euro. Latvian governments were also firmly committed to join
the euro after its EU accession (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Latvia’s currency
peg, limited monetary autonomy, capital convertibility, and informal euroization
combined to trigger a major lending and mortgage boom. During the 2000s,
7 http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/global-financial-development-database.
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Latvia became one of the most financialized economies in East Central Europe. Its
growth model relied almost entirely on investment in banking, real estate, and
construction (Becker et al. 2010; Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Finance-led growth
spurred high inflation rates, and given that Latvia’s Central Bank could not use
interest rates to rein in inflation, borrowing became increasingly cheaper
(Blanchard et al. 2013: 333). Tax policies further contributed to the boom: Latvia
did not levy any property tax on residential buildings or capital gain taxes (Aslund
and Dombrovskis 2011: 29). No small wonder that Latvians took out increasing
volumes of mortgage loans to buy ever more expensive homes. As in Hungary, the
IMF and the Central Bank started issuing warnings about the unsustainability of
the lending boom (IMF 2006, interview at the Bank of Latvia, Riga, Latvia, 25
September 2015) from the mid-2000s onwards. However, neither regulators nor
politicians seemed to be particularly concerned, while banks even stepped up their
aggressive lending behavior (interviews with an entrepreneur, Riga, Latvia, 21
September 2015 and with a former cabinet minister, Riga, Latvia, 22 September
2015; Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011; Bukeviciute and Kosicki 2012: 5).
Summary
This section has identified several similarities but also differences in the build-up of the
mortgage booms in peripheral Europe. Differences in EU integration—EMU, EU, or
EEA membership—do not seem to imply systematic differences in terms of the
mechanisms that have set off the lending booms. In all four countries, EU-induced
external liberalization and domestic policies of deregulation and privatization of the
banking sector have channeled dominantly international liquidity into mortgage fi-
nance. Borrowing in euro reduced the costs of credit significantly for Ireland, as the
ECB set interest rates with view of the whole eurozone. However, non-EMU members
found functional equivalents, namely borrowing in foreign currency. In all cases,
peripheral countries could thus piggyback on interest rates set for much less
inflation-prone economies.
Integration in European financial markets—whether as EMU, EU, or EEA
member—allowed all four countries to escape the narrow confines of their
domestic financial markets. International finance of emerging mortgage markets
has taken two forms. In Ireland and Iceland, banks relied strongly on wholesale
markets, while in Latvia and Hungary direct foreign bank penetration and the
financing of local affiliates through their parent banks played a key role. These
differences notwithstanding, both forms led to excessively leveraged banking
systems and extensive maturity mismatches, as short-term funds borrowed
abroad were invested in long-term mortgages (Schwartz 2011). The four coun-
tries were not entirely stripped of regulatory instruments to circumvent the
systemic danger inherent in this. Rather, governments and supervisory author-
ities were either unwilling or unable (and typically both) to curb foreign
borrowing and domestic lending and to hedge against the risks.
The high dependence on foreign borrowing proved to be the Achilles heel of
the housing finance systems. The next section will explore how the crisis
exposed the hierarchical nature of peripheral financialization, and how govern-
ments in the four countries responded to the crisis of (mortgage) finance.
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The Mortgage Boom Turns Bust: Crisis and Crisis Management
Table 2 provides a snapshot view on the exposure of the Latvian, Hungarian, Icelandic,
and Irish populations and banks to the housing and mortgage crisis. It reveals that while
the depth and mix of the exposure differed across the four countries, in all cases,
households have faced increasing risks of over-indebtedness related to rising unem-
ployment and decreasing house prices; and in three cases, they also faced significant
exposure to exchange rate risks. All of this resulted in a ballooning of non-performing
loans, threatening the stability of the banking sector. High share of foreign debt further
endangered the banks.
The financial turmoil from 2008 onwards adversely affected the banking systems.
All four countries experienced sudden stops of capital inflows, resulting in sharp
recessions (Berthaud and Colliac 2010; Gros and Alcidi 2013; see also Fig. 3), and
when the sudden stops turned into liquidity or solvency crises of their banks, Europe’s
peripheral countries learned who the “ultimate guardian” of their transnationally
integrated financial systems was (Pistor 2009). In none of the four countries was the
national bank able to act as lender of the last resort. All four countries had to turn to the
IMF and/or EU to get access to much needed liquidity, and these organizations
coordinated the processes and set the terms for restructuring the financial systems.
The terms differed, and governments faced tough decisions on whether to comply with
the conditionality or risk being shut off from international markets altogether. Below, I
explore how the four countries negotiated the international constraints, choices, and
trade-offs that they faced once the crisis broke out, and how these have shaped the
housing finance regimes.
Hungary and Iceland: Rejecting Financialization
Hungary
Hungary turned to the IMF when its banking sector faced a liquidity crisis resulting
from the turmoil in the foreign currency swap market (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011).
Its crisis response evolved in two distinct phases. The first phase was overshadowed by
the conditions of the IMF stand-by agreement signed in autumn 2008, and the fear that
foreign banks would pull out from the region (Epstein 2014).8 It was the so-called
Vienna Initiative, a series of accords signed by several East Central European states
with ten major European banks and the IMF to maintain the presence of exposed banks
that secured foreign bank presence (Pistor 2012). In the agreements, parent banks
committed to support their subsidiaries in the region, roll over their credits, and
capitalize them adequately. In those countries that had stand-by agreements with the
IMF, banks made their commitment dependent on their host governments’ compliance
(ibid.). Under these conditions, the housing question was not a priority for the
8 In November 2008, the IMF approved a €12.5 billion loan to Hungary to help it weather the crisis. The IMF-
supported economic program had two key objectives: fiscal consolidation and the stabilization of the financial
sector. This was part of a broader IMF-World Bank and EU administered loan of all in all €20 billion (Lütz and
Kranke 2014).
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government. It rather saw as its most urgent tasks to rein in the public debt and deficit,
as defined by the IMF stand-by agreement signed in autumn 2008.
As the crisis unfolded, however, the question of foreign currency loans became
increasingly pressing. After the Hungarian Central Bank had scrapped the currency
band in 2008 and let the forint float, the latter massively depreciated against the Swiss
franc, leaving forex-indebted homeowners in dire straits (IMF 2012: 19). This is the
background of the second phase of crisis response under Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ
government, which came to power in 2010. FIDESZ redesigned central elements of
the Hungarian housing and housing finance system in the context of a deep economic
and social crisis. In autumn 2011, it proclaimed a war against “debt slavery” (Bohle
2014; Johnson and Barnes 2015). The government’s overtly nationalistic and anti-
finance-capital discourse aimed at pitting vulnerable households against foreign banks,
thus generating support for its interventionist policies among all strata of society. The
discourse was followed by deeds. In the course of its war against debt slavery, Hungary
severed its ties with the IMF and sought to alleviate the burdens for households with
foreign currency loans. Conversions of the forex loans at preferential exchange rates, an
exchange rate protection mechanism, and finally, the mandatory conversion of almost
all forex loans into Hungarian forint all were part of the government’s toolkit. Banks
were also forced to compensate borrowers for exchange rate spreads and unilateral
interest rate changes. The costs of these measures were mostly pushed onto the banks,
which already reeled from the burdens of hefty extra taxes (Bohle 2014; Johnson and
Barnes 2015; Csizmady and Hegedüs 2016). It is no small wonder then that bank
lending declined sharply. This contributed to the return of the woes of a peripheral
housing regime. Mortgage finance has become a rare good, housing construction is
stagnant, and people are once again stuck to their homes (EMF various issues).
Iceland
Iceland, as Schwartz (2011: 299) writes, “came late to the global party, drank too quick
and hit the floor rather harder than larger economies”. When the crisis erupted, the tiny
country found itself with a hugely over-leveraged banking sector and population, and
overvalued property prices. As Schwartz argues, “leveraging up without a reserve
currency is a titanic mistake” (ibid 292). Its banks were indeed too big to be saved,
and in contrast to Hungary, where parent companies of foreign banks were ready to take
major losses, in the Icelandic case, British and Dutch depositors insisted on guarantees.
Iceland had to turn to the IMF for emergency lending, which, together with the Nordic
Central Banks also contributing to the bailout, administered the usual austerity medi-
cine.9 The IMF also backed the British and Dutch governments’ demand that Iceland
compensate them for bailing out the Icesave depositors. Crisis and austerity triggered a
wave of social unrest, which succeeded in ousting the government. During the protests,
debt write-down emerged as one of the central demands (IMF 2012: 106). As in
Hungary, homeowners who had borrowed in foreign currencies were particularly hard
hit by the devaluation of Iceland’s krona, which depreciated around 60% in the wake of
the crisis.
9 The IMF and Nordic countries together offered a US$4.6 billion loan to Iceland (Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir
2010: 22).
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In 2009, a center-left Social Democratic-Green coalition government came to power,
for the first time in the country’s history. This government undertook a number of
interventionist steps in financial, currency and housing sectors, which fundamentally
altered the previous financialized model (Hart-Landsberg 2013: n.p.). In terms of housing
policies, the government adopted a number of measures fast in order to prevent over-
indebted homeowners from losing their homes. These included “a moratorium on fore-
closure, a temporary suspension of debt service for exchange-rate and CPI-indexed loans,
and rescheduling (payment smoothing) of these loans” (IMF 2012: 106). In addition to the
government, the Supreme Court has played a major role in dealing with the legacy of
foreign currency loans. In 2010, it ruled that foreign currency indexation had not been in
line with existing laws, and loans had to be recalculated. According toMéndez Pinedo and
Domurath (2015: 112), “the recalculation of illegal FX-indexed loans has so far been the
most important tool for indebted and over-indebted Icelandic consumers to alleviate their
debt burden.” As in Hungary, a substantial part of the costs of loan restructuring was
pushed onto the banks. As to future mortgage lending, a number of initiatives point to a
more restrictive environment (Bank of Iceland 2014: 71).
Ireland and Latvia: Embracing Financialization
Ireland
Pundits and the media alike often depict Iceland’s crisis management as the polar
opposite of Ireland’s. While Iceland let its banks go bust, Ireland saved them at
enormous cost. While Iceland’s economy profited from the substantial devaluation of
the krona, Ireland had to accept the straightjacket of EMU and pursue internal
devaluation. While Iceland pushed some of the costs of the crisis onto foreigners,
Ireland had to internalize the costs to save German and French bondholders. Although
some of the crisis response was related to domestic choices, Ireland’s EMU member-
ship weighed hard on the country’s options.
In 2008, the Irish government reacted to large losses in the banking sector by issuing
a blanket guarantee of the liabilities of all troubled banks, and subsequently by injecting
massive capital in the banking sector and the nationalization of its banks. As a result,
public deficit and debt soared and Ireland had to turn to the Troika of the EU, IMF, and
ECB for emergency lending to avert a sovereign default.10 Thus, for Ireland, the Troika
turned into the ultimate guardian of its troubled banks, and set harsh conditions for the
rescue. The most contentious and weighty condition was that Ireland had to bail out
senior bond holders (European Court of Auditors 2015).
The massive austerity that followed the bank guarantee and EU-IMF bailout led to a
veritable crisis in housing and housing finance. Non-performing loans soared, and the
Troika pushed Ireland for tougher eviction legislation (Irish Times, 11/12/2012). In this
context, it is not surprising that Ireland—together with Latvia—is one of the few EU
countries in which the number of evictions increased between 2010 and 2013 (Kenna
et al. 2016). However, the absolute number of repossessions remains relatively low,
mostly because banks have not been eager to foreclose property, as this step might
result in real losses and bring the undercapitalization of banks into the open (Phillips
10 The loan totaled some €66 billion (European Court of Auditors 2015: 17).
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2013). Social housing also suffered during the crisis. Already neglected for decades, the
remaining meager budget was further retrenched in 2008–2014 (Department of the
Environment, Community and Local Government 2014). Only in 2014 did the gov-
ernment outline a new strategy towards social housing. Most of the support, however, is
not dedicated to public social housing, but rather subsidizes rental payments. This
dovetails a more substantial change in the Irish housing regime, namely the rise of
private rentals (Norris 2016). In 2011, almost one in five families lived in private
rentals, and the proportion in cities is even higher (Threshold 2014: 3).
Latvia
Latvia’s policy response to its banking and mortgage crisis has been most similar to that
of Ireland. Its immediate response was overshadowed by the run on its biggest domestic
bank, PAREX. In response to the run, the government took over majority control for a
symbolic price. The costs of recapitalizing and the need for restructuring PAREX were
the major reasons why the Latvian government turned to the IMF in 2008 (Aslund and
Dombrovskis 2011: 35). At the same time, Latvia’s currency came under tremendous
pressure. The major focuses of the IMF-EU-Nordic bailout package were macroeco-
nomic aspects of the crisis, including the exchange rate.11
A crucial policy decision of the Latvian government was to avoid devaluation of the
lats and instead prepare for euro entry. This was a very controversial decision: a number
of internationally renowned economists and the IMF team suggested that Latvia
abandon its currency peg to regain competitiveness (Lütz and Kranke 2014). The
Latvian government, however, decided not to heed this advice and instead engaged
in one of the toughest austerity packages in Europe in order to defend the peg
(interview with an economist, Riga, Latvia, 22 September 2015; Eihmanis 2017).
The severity of Latvia’s adjustment was one of the major reasons for over-indebt-
edness. The government did little to help over-indebted homeowners. Under the
pressure of banks, and also because mortgages were mostly held by more affluent
segments of the population, it decided against public support for household debt
restructuring (Erbenova et al. 2011: 16). Instead, banks restructured the loans, typically
without reducing the overall value of the debt (ibid: 11). Austerity and market-based
debt restructuring led to significant increase of evictions (Kenna et al. 2016: 61).
One of the most worrisome features for over-indebted homeowners was that “[I]n
the case of mortgage default at the moment, banks could repossess the property, take
second properties if owned, and also recoup further debt from the future earnings of the
borrower” (Traynor 2009). Indeed, one of my interviewees stated: “There are in my
opinion more people displaced by repossessions than by the early privatization”
(interview with an economist, Riga, Latvia, 21 September 2015). Successive Latvian
governments tried to change this by shifting some of the risks of underwater mortgages
on the banks. These attempts failed because the Nordic banks put up huge resistance
(Eglitis 2015).
Overall, despite a relatively fast recovery of the economy, mortgage lending has
remained slow since the crisis broke out, while house prices have been increasing,
11 Latvia’s IMF-EU-Nordic countries loan was €7.5 billion, 40% of its GDP (European Court of Auditors
2015: 17). For a thorough discussion of the loan and conditionality, see Lütz and Kranke (2014).
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especially in Riga. This is mostly due to the Latvian government offering second
residency for foreigners who buy real estate (Hendersen 2014). For locals, access to
housing remains difficult, with unemployment still high, incomes low, and bank
lending only cautiously (IMF 2016).
Summary
This section has argued that the crisis has revealed the hierarchical nature of core-
periphery financial relations. In light of a sudden stop of capital flows, none of the four
countries were able to stabilize their economies on their own. The conditions set by the
ultimate guardians of their transnationally integrated financial systems differed, as did
domestic crisis responses. Thus, Hungary and Iceland have by and large rejected the
previous paths of financialization, with Hungary’s answer being more extreme, while
Ireland and Latvia have mostly accepted the discipline of financialization. The con-
cluding section will take a step back and ask how the different policy responses relate to
the broader trajectories these countries have embarked upon, and what all of this tells of
for the future of peripheral housing finance(ialization).
Conclusions: the Past and Future of Peripheral Housing Finance
Puzzled by the rapid increase of mortgage lending in a number of European peripheral
countries, this paper has shed light on the trajectories of housing finance in four
countries. I argued that a number of common themes run through the rapid build-up
of mortgage debt. EU-induced external liberalization and deregulation, and in the East
Central European cases, privatization of the banking sector washed these countries with
excessive liquidity. Additionally, the integration into the European single market,
economic area, or eurozone dramatically decreased the costs of borrowing for the
peripheral countries and allowed them to escape their narrow domestic deposit base.
An important share of international liquidity went into housing finance. In three of the
four countries, inexperienced banks were at the origin of the mortgage booms, and in
all countries, governments and supervisory authorities were either unwilling or unable
(and typically both) to rein in banks and the risky lending boom.
Is there anything specific to these mortgage booms which make them peripheral?
After all, the liberalization of mortgage finance, an increasing reliance on foreign
funding, and regulatory forbearance have been the hallmark of mortgage booms prior
to the crisis elsewhere, notably in the USA and UK (Fernandez and Aalbers 2016).
First, I show that the nature of demand for housing finance differs. In Europe’s East,
high homeownership rates, virtually non-existing mortgage markets, and stagnant
housing construction during the 1990s led to a pent-up demand for housing and
housing finance (Bohle 2014). In Europe’s North West, highly decommodified
property-based welfare systems have become marketized (Norris 2016). This differs
from the more sophisticated deepening of already commodified mortgage finance, and
its expansion to subprime segments particularly in the USA.
Second, the form of internationalization of mortgage finance differs. In the four
cases, banks were at the origin of mortgage booms. In Europe’s East, transnational
banks were dominantly financed by parent banks, whereas in the two Northwestern
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countries, domestic banks borrowed on wholesale markets via interbank lending. In
contrast to the USA or UK, securitization of mortgages and their selling to institutional
investors did not play a key role.
Third, all countries leveraged up internationally without the benefits of a reserve
currency (Schwartz 2011). This is what made these countries particularly vulnerable to
sudden stops and reversal in credit flows. The sudden reversals of credit flows shook
the foundations of the peripheral financial systems, and their stabilization has revealed
the hierarchical nature of peripheral financialization. None of the countries was strong
enough to stabilize their financial systems on their own, and only during the crisis that it
turned out who the ultimate guardian of their transnationally integrated financial
systems was (Pistor 2009). The international constraints stemming from the condition-
ality of the ultimate guardians differed considerably across the cases. Arguably,
Hungary was the country least constrained. Its banking sector only faced a liquidity
crisis resulting from the turmoil in the foreign currency swap market (Aslund and
Dombrovskis 2011). What is more, ultimately, the reliance on foreign banks allowed
Hungary to outsource much of its troubles to the parent banks. This was also true for
Latvia.
The constraints facing Ireland and Iceland were of higher magnitude, but of polar
opposite nature. Iceland found out that no ultimate guardian was able or willing to
stabilize its vastly oversized banking sector. Its own Central Bank was unable to act as
lender of the last resort, and an international stand-by credit by the IMF and the Nordic
countries helped to stabilize the economy, but only after the banking sector collapsed.
In contrast, Ireland discovered that belonging to the eurozone does not provide shelter
for peripheral countries in crisis. Because of the no-bailout clause of the Maastricht
treaty, it found its access to capital markets blocked, while its Troika rescue package
reflected concerns for the eurozone system as a whole, rather than the particular Irish
woes. Therefore, Ireland had the harshest conditions for the revival of its defunct
banking system.
What do these different constraints mean for the future of housing financialization?
Table 3 below summarizes the findings. I have highlighted two issues: on the one hand,
the policy responses through which each country tried to negotiate the international
constraints and, on the other hand, the level of mortgage debt prior to the crisis. Thus,
Hungary and Iceland rejected the previous paths of marketization of mortgages, while
Ireland and Latvia submitted to the discipline of international finance. However, given
the difference in the initial depth of their mortgage markets, the results of policy choices
differed. The Hungarian policy response successfully reversed the path of housing
financialization. Squeezing the banks certainly relieved upper middle class over-
Table 3 The future of peripheral housing financialization




High Reduced financialization, but vulnerability
remains (Iceland)
Financialization taken to a new level
(Ireland)
Low Voluntary return to peripheral housing
regime (Hungary)
Unintended return to peripheral
housing regime (Latvia)
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indebted homeowners, but it also led to a dramatic decline in mortgage lending. This
was welcomed by the government, which sought to limit the overall role of finance in
the economy and to direct bank lending towards productive capacities. As it did not
offer comprehensive alternatives to homeownership or public housing finance, the
consequence has been a return to the peripheral housing regime. Interestingly, the
outcome was quite similar in Latvia. In the Latvian case, it was unintended. In contrast
to Hungary, the Latvian authorities never sought to curtail lending or rein in the
banking sector. Rather, a combination of more prudential international norms, more
cautious lending by the international banks, and borrowers whose economic outlook is
still not stable have driven out housing financialization, at least for the time being.
This contrasts with the Irish case. Banks remain major players in mortgage and
housing markets. Here, policy responses have taken financialization of housing to the
next level. Limited supply and rising house prices combine with tight mortgage lending
to produce increasing wealth inequality, with a “generation landlord” increasing their
housing capital at the costs of “generation rent” (Ronald et al. 2015; Regan 2016).
While there might be alternatives to returning to the peripheral housing regime, and
the increasing inequality of wealth that the post-crisis phase of financialization pro-
duced, the Icelandic post-crisis pathway shows that this is a thin line to walk. The state
took back control over mortgage finance, ruled out risky forms of peripheral
financialization, and tried to revive public housing. At the same time, however, the
IMF (2015 n.p.) has recently warned that “the loss-making government-owned Hous-
ing Financing Fund, which currently dominates the mortgage market, needs to be
unwound as its business model is no longer viable and replaced by a financially viable
successor housing program”.
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